Yet More Evidence That Saudi Arabia Won't Balance the Market

Controlling almost 20% of global oil reserves, Saudi Arabia has a unique ability to control the market's supply, something it has shown willingness to do in the past to stabilize prices. The recent crisis, however, has brought about a previously unknown version of Saudi Arabia, one unwilling to reduce supply to balance a massively over-supplied market.

This week, oil continued its 70% tumble over the past 18 months, ending under $35 a barrel. Still, Saudi Arabia refused to cut supply at the previous OPEC meeting, believing it has the money and the patience to take market share by outlasting every other global supplier.


Many have discussed the numerous factors that would logically cause Saudi Arabia to cut supply sooner than it wishes, including a crumbling fiscal situation, both politically and budgetary. However, analysts may be surprised by how long the country will be willing to pump out supply.

Last week, we wrote that "while economics and fiscal analysis may indicate that Saudi Arabia will start to act more rationally regarding supply, don't be surprised if they keep prices low, crippling Iran's economic benefit from repealed sanctions." Since then, there have been a few key news items that add to this thesis.

First, a bit of history. Following Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in 1979, oil-rich rulers across the Middle East spread weapons and cash throughout the region, seeking to become the dominant influencer. This event is still one of the key contributors to unrest today, as Saudi Arabia and Iran were two of the biggest entitles vying for power over the area. Today, the two oil-rich theocracies, one Shiite and one Sunni, are vying for regional dominance yet again.

With sanctions set to be lifted, Iran is ready to receive hundreds of millions in additional revenues to fund whatever they please. According to a recent note from Oppoenhiemer's James Schumm: "Though low oil prices hurt Saudi Arabia, they negatively impact Iran in a much greater way and it crimps Iran's ability to fund sectarian uprisings in Saudi Arabia's backyard."

To maintain power and prevent an Arab uprising at home, Saudi royalty must keep the country's powerful extremist Sunni clerical establishment on its side. Keeping oil prices low helps limit Iran's benefits from repealed sanctions, as increased oil exports will be considerably less valuable. This wins big points at home, while also ensuring Saudi Arabia's dominant position as chief regional influencer.