Why we need enhanced anti money laundering regulations

Money laundering in the maritime and shipping industry is a significant but often underreported issue due to the sector's complexity and international scope. With multi-layered and international ownership structures, it has become increasingly susceptible to money laundering.

These operations' sheer scale and complexity create gaps that bad actors can exploit, obscuring illicit activities across jurisdictions with inconsistent regulatory frameworks. Where transparency is already a challenge, complex shipping operations make hiding the true origins of financial transactions easy.

Bion Behdin, chief revenue officer, First AML
Bion Behdin, chief revenue officer, First AML

While regulators work to address these vulnerabilities, many compliance frameworks remain outdated, often relying on manual processes. This leaves organisations exposed to financial crimes that can result in significant fines, operational disruptions, and reputational damage.

As money laundering techniques evolve, the maritime industry must adopt stronger, tech-driven compliance tools and establish more consistent anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. Without these advancements, businesses risk becoming unwitting participants in illegal activities, further complicating global trade and financial systems.

A money laundering haven

Maritime trade is inherently a cross-border activity. As it constantly flows between different jurisdictions and regulations, bad actors can exploit loopholes and hide beneficial ownership structures and identities better.

The UK government website outlines a range of evasion practices used to circumvent its financial sanctions. In particular, it summarises the vulnerability of complex ownership structures.

Many global shipping operations, for example, are naturally and legitimately complex due to “the need to balance lawful risk exposures to their assets under regional and international laws”, according to the UK government. However, these structures also allow bad actors to use shell companies and multiple levels of ownership “to disguise the ultimate beneficial owner of cargo or commodities”.

Clearly, without the right customer due diligence and technology to assist, trying to uncover entity structures and identify the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) of shipments is incredibly challenging. Other deceitful tactics include false flags and flag hopping, where vessels operate under another country’s flag or continually swap them, ships taking irregular routes to mask the final destination of the cargo, and fraudulent documentation.

Trying to uncover entity structures and identify the ultimate beneficial owner of shipments is incredibly challenging.