Despite ongoing high-level exchanges, tensions between Washington and Beijing still seem to be rising on many issues such as trade, technology, Taiwan, the South China Sea and Ukraine. Where do you see US-China relations heading in the near future?
Chinese officials have voiced frustration that while the Chinese are making significant efforts to address the concerns on the American list that came up at the San Francisco summit, the Americans haven't kept to their side of the bargain on the list of Chinese concerns.
There are reasons for that that probably have to do with political constraints in the US. We have to defer to our legal system, we have to defer to our Congress, we have three coequal branches of government, and they all get involved.
There may have been some asymmetry in the lists of concerns that Biden and Xi presented; typically, the US list includes many specific concerns whereas the Chinese list is more abstract, involving big issues such as Taiwan, regional security, etc.
That's why I think in US-China relations, the summits between the leaders have always been so important, because there are so many complications and so many problems. Inevitably, after the big meeting where you produce a list of outcomes, things are seemingly on a better track. Immediately after the San Francisco summit, for example, you saw a stabilisation of US-China relations. And then it fades over time and things get more difficult. And then you have to try to come together again and renew that.
This dynamic is not new in US China relations although, of course, now it's a particularly difficult time.
As an expert on Taiwan who used to be in charge of Taiwan policy at the US Department of State, how do you view the situation in the Taiwan Strait? How close are Washington and Beijing to a conflict over the island? Many observers see the South China Sea as a riskier hotspot - what do you think?
The only issue that can bring the US and China into a major power conflict, complete with the potential for nuclear exchange, is the Taiwan issue. This is why every time US and Chinese leaders meet we see a focus on this issue. Such focus is welcome and necessary to ensure that there is no misunderstanding or misperception of intentions and actions.
The Biden administration has made efforts over the past year to tamp down the tensions across the Taiwan Strait and articulate a clear and consistent policy where it's not moving every day and where it's disciplined. I think this has been overdue but it has been successful.
That said, I assess the potential for a crisis over Taiwan as high and I worry about increasing pressure by Beijing on Taiwan and about limited understanding and appreciation of the complexities of this issue on the part of many actors. The danger is that the escalating security dilemma cannot be controlled and will produce exaggerated perceptions of risk.
One key to avoiding this is to ensure that relevant parties have clear communication channels and understand perceptions of the other parties. Poor communication across the Taiwan Strait is a particular vulnerability. I would certainly advocate increased communication and exchanges across the strait, but these have been difficult to resurrect due to actions on both sides.
What is the end goal of the US in the competition with China?
The goal of both the US and Chinese governments is to make their country stronger and to improve the well-being of their people. The competition concept comes from the traditional Malthusian notion of a zero-sum contest for resources in this effort. Put simply, the end goal of the US competition with China is to employ a galvanising effect for successful self-strengthening.
It is of course true that some competition between the US and China is inevitable, as it is between all countries, especially major powers. The question, however, which is still in play, is whether the competition is really zero-sum and existential. Strictly zero-sum geostrategic competition, such as that seen in the Cold War, is not inevitable and has multiple potential downsides.
The biggest downside is the heightened risk of military conflict. Given that the Taiwan issue is a long-standing source of military tension in the relationship, of course the shift to zero-sum competition makes this much more dangerous and prone to crisis.
The other big negative effect is that, if seen through the lens of zero-sum competition with China, US efforts at self-strengthening will be dominated by China fears as opposed to more strategic and rational considerations of national interest. In other words, exaggerating threats from China and the zero-sum competition will inevitably lead to a misallocation of resources.
I do not see the US-China competition as zero-sum or existential; there is a need for US (and Chinese) self-strengthening, and there will be competition as well as cooperation in US-China relations as we pursue this. With wise leadership, though, it is all quite manageable.
I think this is the limitation with this kind of high-level signalling, especially in the very laden information environment that we live in today.
All the stories fade more quickly. You need to keep renewing those signals, keep showing your determination, to press on with a certain direction.
I think the people-to-people exchange is a great example. There are so many parts of the bureaucracy that are involved in people-to-people exchange, travel and tourism agencies, airlines, visa-issuing officers, border control people and people who review at universities or elsewhere ... You have all these moving parts. If you're not continually renewing the signal at a high level, these people can somehow think they heard a different signal from somewhere and get off track.
That happens in our system because we have a lot of different voices. In the case of China, you also have big bureaucracies with lots of different competing interests and goals that they're trying to achieve. They're not always able to reconcile their competing goals in the way that we think should most align with that leaders' statement last year.
The fact that the two presidents were able to meet and have a very detailed and deep discussion about the major concerns and then, importantly, send out signals to the world but also to their own staffs through that vehicle about their intent to stabilise the relationship and turn it in a more constructive and less histrionic direction, was effective.
Since then, we've seen all these important engagements at the cabinet secretary level but also at working levels to work on specific issues, macroeconomics and finance, law enforcement, consular, drug control, military-to-military consultations and the first AI dialogue.
This is all good. And it pales in comparison, frankly, to what I think we actually need in order to have a better understanding of even what the questions are that we're trying to answer among the two of us in the relationship, and on all these issues. But at least communication got a kick-start from the San Francisco meeting and it's been expanding since.
Even though we're getting close to the election, which is the politically sensitive period, interaction is still expanding, exchanges continue and we're still talking on all these issues.
As tensions between South Korea and North Korea have recently soared, what role do you think China can play in de-escalating the situation on the Korean peninsula?
Clearly the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has made the situation in both Europe and northeast Asia much more dangerous, and it is in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions. This is an ominous trend that China should be trying to roll back. Ultimately, I believe China will have to be involved more actively in a multilateral process to make progress with North Korea, but I don't see North Korea being interested in that at the moment.
You have worked on Soviet Union and Russia issues. How and to what extent do you expect the current close ties between Beijing and Moscow to affect Sino-American relations?
My worry is that the close ties between China and Russia will have a lingering negative effect on China-US relations out of all proportion to the actual dangers of the China-Russia relationship. China-Russia cooperation is limited by the inherent differences in the two systems and cultures, by their fierce defence of their own national sovereignty and by long-standing and nascent rivalry. It is not in US interests to view and treat Russia and China as the same, and yet we increasingly see the two conflated rhetorically and in policy. This is a mistake.
This misapprehension of the China-Russia relationship has come about, in part, because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the way it unfolded and the shock with which it was received in Europe. China has still not well understood the depths of the shock of Russia's invasion and subsequent war in Europe, and the impact that has had on China's foreign relations with the West, including the US.
You have taken part in many US-China Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy events [unofficial dialogues involving non-state actors, with Track 1.5 including some government representatives for semi-formal discussions] and have visited Beijing several times this year, including communicating with young Chinese students. What are your takeaways from these exchanges? What do you think of the views of Chinese officials and scholars with whom you have interacted on the US and bilateral relations?
It is important to visit China if you want to know what is happening there. This has always been true, but it is more true now. I feel like it's really necessary to have people who are here and talking to people and can go back and meet with people in the US and say what people are thinking here, especially since what people are thinking isn't necessarily what they're saying. And there are a lot of limitations on what people can say now, on both sides.
I think getting reality injected into the conversations both in Beijing and in Washington is very important.
We've had quite a few Chinese delegations visiting the US in recent months. Many are people who have been working on US-China relations for a long time. They know the US and they've seen ups and downs. I think they are just trying to understand what's going on now and analyse it in an objective way, which is helpful.
Regarding students and younger scholars, I always encourage them to engage, see for themselves and try to understand constraints on the other side. I do find that students bring a healthy scepticism and creativity to the conversations, which gives me hope for the future.
How do you think China's initiative of hosting 50,000 young Americans in five years is going? Some argue that there has been a new common wisdom in US society that life can work without China, so it is hard for US companies and students to go to China as actively as before. What is your view about that?
I think we really don't know actually what the effect of the pandemic has been on this kind of thing and how long it might last. A lot of students didn't do their semester abroad or a year abroad during Covid, and certainly they didn't do it in China.
That's a big cohort of people from America that didn't have that chance that people had had the years before.
Teenagers coming to China and the 50,000-student initiative is certainly welcome and very good.
[Travelling somewhere overseas for the first time] is a huge barrier-breaking experience. My first trip was when I was a teenager with my grandmother, I went to London. London is not that different from Boston where I grew up, but it was so much stimulation - really just changed my whole life. I loved it.
This is what can happen for people who come to China at that same age. It's a very good age to have an overseas international experience, especially if they can explore China.
What do you think of the US travel warning on China, which remains at "reconsider travel"? Is the stabbing attack on four US instructors in Jilin in June affecting bilateral people-to-people exchanges?
The travel advisory alteration would be very helpful. It's not a complete stumbling block to travel, but it's certainly a deterrent.
I believe that is in play and being worked on and that hopefully will get the right answer at some point in the near future, probably not before the election.
We need more flights, the flight prices need to be cheaper. We need more direct flights, more cities to be connected directly and make it more convenient for travel. If they can do visa-free ... to get these students here, that's one less hassle for them to come, so that would be great.
These are some of the things that should be low-hanging fruit. Some of them are a chicken-and-egg-kind of problem, like the flights - you have got to have the demand to get the flights.
I do get a lot of calls from people in the US asking me if it's safe for their daughter/son to travel somewhere in China or the school soccer team to travel, or the music class. I always answer those questions and promote a positive answer. But that isn't going to be enough to turn the tide.
As a prominent China hand, what do you think about the concern that American officials and scholars who 'know China' find shrinking influence and space in the US? How do you assess the younger generation of American scholars and policymakers working on China? Is there a generational clash in the way they look at China?
Right now, we're going through a sort of populist wave. Expertise is not highly valued in some quarters.
The US has a lot of experts on China. I've heard the critique that there aren't a lot of experts on China at high levels, for example, in the State Department, but there are a lot of experts on China at the State Department who I know, who are very good, who know China very well and who are giving advice.
I do not think there's a generational clash. But because of the surge in globalisation there's a huge group now that's so-called zhongguo tong [China hand]. I think there's a division within that cohort of people who are the engager group and the people who are more focused on competition; competition is more in vogue now, certainly.
That's the divide that I see. Some say there are no more "engagers" in the US, but that's not true. They are there but they are quiet, just like the "engagers" in China.
As a seasoned diplomat, could you share some key moments that significantly shaped your perspective on US-China relations? What lessons do you think these experiences can offer for how the two countries should get along in future?
For me, the most revealing episodes were negotiations with Chinese counterparts on some issue that we're trying to work on. It's extremely revealing about the other side's system and logic, constraints and culture.
I remember the six-party talks held in Beijing on the Korean peninsula issues, the elaborate diplomatic dances that were done to keep discussions from falling apart and the diligent way Chinese diplomats worked to try to get a deal.
I remember the negotiations in the lead-up to Xi Jinping's visit to Washington in 2015 when we were sitting in the foreign ministry with our counterparts, going over the results document, changing words and saying: What do you mean here? What do you mean there? Why do you need that word? Why don't you like this word?
I remember the negotiations that we had on the eve of the Washington summit meeting in September 2015 very late at night with the Chinese team on the US-China Cyber Agreement that was announced in the course of that meeting. We had to haggle over the language for many hours until 2.00 in the morning. So words are very important, or used to be, and I think they should be in diplomacy. High-pressure negotiations give two teams a common goal, a deadline and reveal much about our common humanity.
This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the SCMP app or visit the SCMP's Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2024 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
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