Venue Defamation Republication Conditional Privilege
Reed v. Brown, PICS Case No. 17-1236 (Pa. Commw. July 13, 2017) Hearthway, J. (12 pages).
Trial court erred in holding that venue was proper only in county where allegedly defamatory statement was made because complaint sufficiently alleged that republication occurred in Philadelphia where the city of Philadelphia was the recipient of the republication, understood the defamatory meaning and applied it to appellant in appellant's defamation action based on borough manager's telling background check company that appellant was terminated for misconduct when he had actually resigned. Reversed.
Appellant resigned from borough police department in an open meeting before borough council and applied for a job with the city of Philadelphia. Philadelphia offered him a job conditioned upon employment verification and then rescinded the offer of employment after borough manager told background check company that appellant was fired for misconduct. Appellant sued for defamation and defendants argued improper venue. The trial case ordered the case transferred to the Delaware CCP because the cause of action arose in Delaware county. Appellant appealed.
Appellant contended the trial court failed to give proper weight to his choice of forum and that venue was proper in Philadelphia because the cause of action occurred in Philadelphia. Appellees argued that nothing showed that manager published any statements in Philadelphia and that he allegedly made his statements in a phone call that was not alleged to have occurred in Philadelphia. Appellees argued that the place where damages became manifest was not sufficient to establish an occurrence from which a cause of action arose. The court noted that appellant's claim was based on the allegedly defamatory conduct of borough manager in responding to background check company hired to conduct the employment verification check. Those statements were communicated to Philadelphia and its representatives and employees. Appellant's allegations sufficiently alleged that publication of borough manager's statements occurred in Philadelphia and that republication by background check company was authorized, intended or reasonably expected. Where a recipient was privileged to repeat or republish an allegedly defamatory statement and did so within the privilege, the repetition did not prevent the original defamation from being the legal cause of the resulting harm. The complaint sufficiently alleged that republication occurred in Philadelphia where Philadelphia, as the recipient of the republication of the borough manager's remarks, understood the defamatory meaning and applied it to appellant. Venue was where republication occurred and thus, venue was not improper in Philadelphia.