School Superintendent Termination Due Process Disciplinary Hearings Commingling of Functions
Purcell v. Reading Sch. Dist., PICS Case No. 17-1235 (Pa. Commw. July 14, 2017) McCullough, J. (24 pages).
Trial court erred in affirming school board's termination of a school superintendent because the impermissible commingling of investigative and adjudicatory functions by the board raised serious constitutional concerns as to the required due process in administrative proceedings. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Appellant was appointed to five-year term as school superintendent in 2012. The board sent her two letters of reprimand with concerns about the district's budget process before sending her Loudermill letters notifying her of pending discipline in September and October 2013. Appellant and her lawyer did not attend the hearing or a rescheduled hearing and the board denied the request for another continuance, held the hearing and terminated appellant in November 2013. Appellant appealed to the trial court which held that the board improperly denied appellant's request for a hearing. The board held a new hearing. Appellant was charged with entering into contracts with the district without a vote of the board by authorizing two consultants to present at a district retreat even though the board subsequently ratified the obligation to the consultants. She was also charged with neglect of duty for not filling three principal positions in a timely manner, with breach of her employment agreement by not filing written requests for sick leave and vacation days, failing to investigate the conduct of a building principal, failing to submit teacher evaluations, mishandling the budget process and failing to provide a balanced budget. Appellant contested all of the charges. The district found appellant guilty of all charges and affirmed the board's firing of her. Appellant appealed to the court and the trial court affirmed the district's decision. Appellant appealed.
Appellant relied on Lyness v. State Dept. of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204, to argue she was denied due process of law when she was removed by a school board that acted as the complainant, prosecutor, witness and adjudicators of the charges against her. School district argued that there was an inherent amount of commingling of functions in public school disciplinary proceeding and that Lyness had no applicability and that appellant received sufficient due process where she had notice and appellate options through her contract and state law. The Pennsylvania courts had made clear that due process rights were fully applicable to adjudicative hearings. The court found that the case was similar to Dep't of Educ. v. Oxford Sch., 356 A.2d 857, and that there was no ground of either precedent or reason for the court not to apply the mandate of Lyness. The district's process was infected with the "appearance of nonobjectivity." The charges originated within the board and not from the public, faculty or students. When the hearing was held, the same board members who initiated the charges, testified about the charges and those same members voted to terminate appellant. The district did not even pretend that it should have prevented the commingling of investigative and adjudicatory functions.
Appellant also argued that the charges if true, did not meet the statutory grounds for removal from office. The district asserted that the charges called appellant's conduct into question under three of the four specified grounds in 1080. The court found that the matter had to be remanded to determine who had responsibility for what during the budget process.