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Prison Excessive Force Cases: A Primer

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Ilann Margalit Maazel[/caption] Excessive force on Rikers Island has been the subject of numerous class actions against New York City, including two cases brought by my law firm and others: Ingles v. Toro (S.D.N.Y. 01 Civ. 8279), and Nunez v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. 11 Civ. 5845). But brutality by corrections officers against prisoners remains all too common in jails and prisons throughout New York State. The following is the basic standard for bringing civil rights actions for prison brutality by state or local corrections officers.

The Standard

42 U.S.C. §1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable.” “Person[s]” include corrections officers who work for a municipality, county or state. In the prison context, the key right secured by the Constitution for convicted prisoners is the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials. To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege two elements, one subjective and one objective. First, the prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with a subjectively "sufficiently culpable state of mind." Second, he must allege that the conduct was objectively "harmful enough" or "sufficiently serious" to reach constitutional dimensions. Analysis of the objective prong is "context specific," and "depends upon the claim at issue." Although not "every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action," the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Actions are repugnant to the conscience of mankind if they are ‘incompatible with evolving standards of decency’ or involve "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). A pretrial detainee’s claim of excessive force is governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), the Supreme Court held that excessive force claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment do not require the same subjective intent standard as Eighth Amendment claims. “[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2473. This is so for a number of reasons. Among them, “[t]he language of [the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments] differs, and the nature of the claims often differs. … [P]retrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically’ …. Thus, there is no need here, as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case, to determine when punishment is unconstitutional." Id. at 2475. Going forward, the Kingsley standard may lead to an increased rate of success for excessive force claims litigated by pretrial detainees. Though most federal civil rights claims are brought against individual officers or their supervisors, prisoners can also sue municipalities and counties under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), where the entity engages in a pattern, practice or policy of unconstitutional conduct (as was alleged in Ingles and Nunez). Inmates in state prison, however, cannot sue the State of New York for damages in federal court, because of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Claims against the State of New York must be brought in the New York State Court of Claims. Federal prisoners can also bring Eighth Amendment claims against individual corrections officers, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This is the rough equivalent of a Section 1983 claim against state or local officers. Though Bivens claims are increasingly disfavored in the Supreme Court, they still remain for Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force in federal prison. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017).