NTSB: Crossed brake wires, pilot error, FAA error factored into fatal 2019 Unalaska crash

Nov. 3—The 2019 Unalaska crash of a commercial flight that killed a passenger was caused by crossed wiring that prompted anti-skid brakes to malfunction coupled with the inexperienced pilots' decision to land in gusty tailwinds, according to the federal board that oversees aviation safety.

The Federal Aviation Administration's erroneous decision to approve the Saab 2000 for landing at the demanding Unalaska airport without a long enough runway safety zone also played a role, the five-member National Transportation Safety Board during a probable cause hearing on Tuesday.

The board unanimously approved 10 safety recommendations, the majority addressing the FAA as well as checking for possible wiring issues on the Saab and addressing the potential for human error.

The turboprop operated by Ravn Air Group left Anchorage with 42 passengers and crew and overran the runway at Unalaska in October 2019, killing one passenger and injuring nine others. The short Aleutian runway is notoriously challenging, flanked on both sides by water at the base of a mountain.

The death of 38-year-old Washington state resident David Allan Oltman — killed when parts of the plane's propeller pierced the plane's cabin — was the first crash-related fatality for a U.S. commercial passenger airline in a decade.

A propeller separating and entering a cabin is very rare, leading to just two serious injuries in the past 38 years over millions of flights, chief crash investigator Sathya Silva said during the hearing.

PenAir Flight 3296, a Saab SA-2000, was making a second attempt to land in windy conditions when the accident occurred. Reports contained in a massive docket released last year identified the flight crew as first officer Justin Lunn, 39, and captain Paul Wells, 56.

The pilots missed the first landing and, going around for another approach, Wells suggested landing into a headwind from the other direction, investigators found.

A minute or so before touching down, the pilots checked the wind and a local observer reported a 24-knot tailwind — far higher than the 15 knots both men knew the Saab was rated for, investigators said. But they decided to stick with the original plan, landing with a tailwind later estimated at 15 knots.

Wells knew the other approach was preferable based on the wind but didn't push for it, investigators found.

Both men had barely 100 hours flight time into Unalaska, far less than the 300 hours that PenAir, the prior carrier on the Unalaska route, had required of its pilots.

An NTSB aviation safety division chief, Marvin Frantz, told the board that the Ravn Air Group subsidiary operating the flight "misapplied" a waiver provision so Wells could fly the route.