Highlights Troubling Pattern of Mismanagement, Volatile and Deteriorating Financial Performance, Failure to Execute, and Repeated Efforts to Disenfranchise Shareholders

Both Leading Proxy Advisors Recommend Shareholders Vote on the GOLD Proxy Card

Simpson Oil Cautions the Incumbent Board NOT to Deploy Further Questionable Tactics That Could Delay the Shareholder Meeting or the Integrity of the Vote

Simpson Oil Reminds Shareholders to Visit www.RefuelParkland.com for Details on How to Vote for All Nine of Simpson Oil’s Director Candidates on the GOLD Proxy Card Ahead of May 6 AGM

GRAND CAYMAN, Cayman Islands, April 28, 2025--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Simpson Oil Limited ("Simpson Oil", "we" or "our"), the largest shareholder of Parkland Corporation ("Parkland" or the "Company"), holding 19.8% of the outstanding common shares, today announced that Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. ("ISS") has joined Glass, Lewis & Co. ("Glass Lewis") in recommending that Parkland shareholders support significant change by voting for six of its nine director nominees at the Company’s Annual General Meeting (the "Meeting" or the "AGM") to be held on May 6, 2025.

ISS has recommended that shareholders vote the GOLD proxy card to elect Monty Baker, Michael Christiansen, Chris Folan, Brian Gibson, Darcy Morris, and Karen Stuckey to the Board of Directors (the "Board").

Both ISS and Glass Lewis delivered scathing assessments of the current Board and its prolonged track record of underperformance and value destruction. In recommending the GOLD proxy card, ISS noted:

"…it is paradoxical that the board would concede a compelling case for change, as evidenced by the planned resignation of the company's CEO, commencement of a strategic review, and recommendation for three dissident nominees, while asserting that PKI (and not shareholders) should control how many, and which dissident nominees should be elected."

On governance, ISS criticized the Board’s handling of CEO succession, noting:

"The board's actions with respect to CEO succession in the last year are troubling in view of the fact that little evidence exists robust CEO succession planning measures were implemented, including an evaluation of external CEO prospects, during a pivotal year for CEO performance."

Both proxy advisors also flagged "grave" governance concerns, citing entrenched behaviors and persistent gamesmanship. ISS concluded:

"In short, the board has displayed a troubling pattern of decision-making aimed at thwarting the dissident. This has been reflected in the board's treatment of the dissident, in the board's persistent gamesmanship, and in the board's failure to proactively address leadership and other critical matters. These and other decisions have come at a steep cost to shareholders."