When intelligence agencies co-opt business, the consequences can be deadly

In This Article:

An airport besieged by those desperate to leave as extremists take over the country. The United States, the United Kingdom and their allies deploying aircraft for a mass evacuation. The capital’s airport is the only way out.

This isn’t Kabul in 2021, but Tehran in 1979 in the wake of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Amidst the chaos, a British Airways VC10 flew to Tehran with a crew from the airline’s QRS (quick response standby) team. They were told they were being deployed to fly a 747 with passengers out of Iran.

They were not told that they were also carrying out an extremely risky assignment: picking up a secret military team.

It did not go to plan. The flight was delayed, and years later many of the crew remember vividly the terror of being trapped in a city with hostile crowds and their death chants.

The incident, revealed in my book, Flight 149, is just one of many examples of a civilian craft being used for intelligence purposes, examples that I’ve uncovered in my years of investigative reporting.

British Airways was a nationalized carrier then; it could be argued that doing the government’s bidding was part of its role.

But what about now?

The lines between the state and corporations are increasingly blurred in the fields of security and intelligence. Governments are using private contractors to do work previously done by the official military, and intelligence services are still using civilian means of transport, often with dire consequences for passengers and crew who are not informed of the dangers.

All of these operations are classified. I have reported only historic examples to protect my intelligence sources, but the same type of missions still happen today.

The U.S. and U.K. use groups that are officially off the books—a Delta Force or SAS soldier who through a shuffling of the paperwork is contracted to a private security company. Russia does the same thing. The Wagner network operates in the Ukraine and many other parts of the world, officially not part of the Russian government but likely directed by the Kremlin.

Who takes responsibility for a mission where the private assets of a company are used by a government for national security purposes, for a military or intelligence operation with no official or legal connection to that government?

For example, the ferry Estonia, which sank in 1994 with 852 lives lost, was being used to transport highly sensitive military equipment taken from Russia to the West, via Sweden.

An investigation I did with Scandinavian journalists made worldwide headlines in 2020 with the revelation that there was a hole in the side, possibly caused by an explosion.