China remembers Rumsfeld as pragmatist his successors could learn from
Liu Zhen
5 min read
The death of former US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld has triggered memories in China of the birth of Washington's tougher approach towards Beijing, but has also been a reminder that stable relations may still be possible.
In Rumsfeld's first defence strategy review for the newly sworn-in president George W. Bush in March 2001, he named China as the No 1 threat to US global dominance. But just four years later, Rumsfeld became the first US official to visit a strategic nuclear missile base in China.
Even though Rumsfeld saw China as a threat, he provided an example to his successors of how the US could work with its top adversary, Chinese experts said.
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Rumsfeld, who died on June 29 at the age of 88 from multiple myeloma, was both the youngest and - at the time - the oldest Pentagon chief, serving in Gerald Ford's administration before taking up the role again under Bush. He also worked for Richard Nixon, directing the Office of Economic Opportunity and as a cabinet-rank presidential assistant.
The longtime Republican was most notorious as the architect of Bush's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, he was the first to steer US military focus from Europe to Asia - replacing Russia with China as its principal foe - long before the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" policy.
"Rumsfeld was a hardliner on China. He began to harshly criticise China in the 1990s," said Zhu Feng, an international relations expert with Nanjing University. "He was deeply shaped by the Cold War experience, with strong ideological overtones."
Zhu said Rumsfeld's views about China had two outstanding features - a serious distrust of China's military development, and an intense obsession to maintain absolute US military superiority over the People's Liberation Army.
"The first thing led him to believe the US must lock on China as the top target in the Asia-Pacific region. And the second thing meant his policies were regarded by many as representing the interests of the US military-industrial complex," he said.
Donald Rumsfeld with then-US president Richard Nixon in 1969. Photo: AP alt=Donald Rumsfeld with then-US president Richard Nixon in 1969. Photo: AP
Some of the officials who worked with Rumsfeld went on to hold key roles in successive US administrations, including John Bolton, who was appointed national security adviser by Donald Trump.
"[Rumsfeld's] views used to be on the 'hawkish' side back then, but now such thinking has become the mainstream rhetoric dominant in Washington," Zhu said.
Just a week after Rumsfeld delivered his strategy review in 2001, a PLA fighter jet and a US spy plane collided near Hainan, in southern China, leading to a dangerous spike in military tensions. But attention was soon diverted by the September 11 attacks, with counterterrorism outweighing all other concerns for the US.
China was once again in Rumsfeld's sights by 2005, when he asked at a security forum: "Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder - why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?"
This shift of focus to some extent proved Rumsfeld's vision as a strategist, as it was taken up and developed by Barack Obama's Asia pivot and Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy, according to observers in China.
Su Hao, professor at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, said Rumsfeld and his defence department had shown rare political agility and flexibility.
"Overall, his strategic conservatism and aggressive nature never changed. Essentially, he still considered China as an adversary but - as a pragmatic strategist - he also made flexible adjustments when there was a bigger threat to America's national security," he said.
"But he also tried to find areas of cooperation with China wherever possible."
Rumsfeld initiated an unprecedented degree of military cooperation, with US intelligence officers stationed in China to coordinate on counterterrorism matters.
While he continued to criticise Beijing on a range of issues - notably its expanding defence budget, lack of military transparency, and its threats to use force on Taiwan - Rumsfeld worked with his Chinese counterpart to establish a hotline mechanism, taking inter-military exchanges to a new level.
During his visit to China in 2005, Rumsfeld visited the headquarters of the PLA's Second Artillery Force - now Rocket Force - which is responsible for the country's nuclear and conventional missiles. He also toured the Chinese Military Science Academy, which is in charge of key military R&D.
Then-US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld with Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan during a visit to Beijing in October 2005. Photo: Reuters alt=Then-US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld with Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan during a visit to Beijing in October 2005. Photo: Reuters
Rumsfeld became a symbol of pre-emptive defence strategies, going from advocate to practitioner in his approach to Iraq and Afghanistan. He then added North Korea to the Bush administration's "axis of evil" and threatened to take pre-emptive action against Pyongyang's nuclear programme.
"In the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis, again, Rumsfeld worked with China - first in the four-party talks and then the six-party talks mechanism ... This also showed his pragmatism." Su said.
"From this perspective, he left some lessons for today's US policymakers. A stiff confrontational approach towards China does not work."
