Byron Trott: The billionaires' banker

Byron Trott vividly recalls the day he became Warren Buffett’s investment banker.

It was February 2002, and he’d recently received a call from Hank Paulson, then CEO of Goldman Sachs and Trott’s predecessor as head of the firm’s Chicago office. Tom Murphy Jr., son of the veteran media executive and longtime Buffett pal, was retiring from Goldman. Paulson had just left Buffett’s office in Omaha after informing him that Trott would now be, in banker parlance, “covering” him. “Go see him,” Paulson barked to Trott.

“Not a lot usually shakes me, but I was scared to death when I walked in,” says Trott, who prepared for the meeting by reading all of Berkshire Hathaway’s annual reports. The two hit it off, and the get-to-know-each-other session, scheduled for an hour, ran to three. Before it was over, Trott had a fee-generating assignment from Buffett, who is notoriously stingy about paying investment bankers. “I did what I do with most clients for the first time,” says Trott. “I say, ‘Give me your toughest problem. What have you not been able to accomplish?’ ”

As it happened, Buffett had a pet project, a task that other bankers had failed to embrace. He wanted to create a security that paid Berkshire to borrow money, the opposite of how a loan typically works, with the catch being that investors also would get the right to buy Berkshire stock in the future at a lower premium than in a standard convertible debt offering. The concept was called a negative coupon convertible, and Trott cajoled a former Harvard finance professor working on the capital markets desk at Goldman to design it.

The sale of $400 million worth of the security—unglamorously labeled “Negative .75% SQUARZ”—proved a modest success for Goldman, but it didn’t exactly work out for Buffett. “The risk was that it’d convert,” says Trott, sharing the anecdote publicly for the first time. Buffett’s partner, Charlie Munger, hated the idea of diluting Berkshire’s equity by converting the notes into stock. The notes eventually did convert, as Munger had feared, and Goldman never sold them to another client. “I thought it would be entertaining to put out a deal that would have a negative coupon,” reflects Buffett. “In retrospect, it was not that smart.”

Smart or not, the arcane transaction transformed Trott’s career. By immediately rising to the challenge of his famous client, Trott earned Buffett’s trust, so much so that in 2004 Buffett mentioned Trott by name in his headline-making annual letter to shareholders. “He understands Berkshire far better than any investment banker with whom we have talked and—it hurts me to say this—earns his fee,” he wrote.