Behind major US case against shareholder suits, a tale of two professors

By Alison Frankel

May 23 (Reuters) - For two months last summer, Stanford Law School professor Joseph Grundfest locked himself away in his home office in California's Portola Valley. Grundfest's house overlooks the Santa Cruz Mountains, but his attention was fixed on the piles of paper - mostly U.S. Supreme Court opinions and Congressional reports from the 1930s - stacked on his desk and the surrounding floor. Grundfest researched and wrote for weeks with monastic obsessiveness, speaking to hardly anyone but his research assistants and his wife, who made sure he was eating.

When he emerged in August, Grundfest - an influential former Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission who now sits on the board of the private equity firm KKR & Co - had in hand a 78-page paper larded with more than 400 footnotes. His aim was nothing less than to destroy securities fraud class action lawsuits by shareholders, which have been the bane of many businesses in the U.S. since the Supreme Court endorsed the cases 26 years ago.

Grundfest sent the draft around to several other law professors, including the University of Michigan's Adam Pritchard, another favorite of pro-business groups. Pritchard read Grundfest's paper with a sense of familiarity: Five years earlier, in a study for the Cato Institute, he had pinpointed the same obscure provision of a 1934 securities law as the means to curtail big settlements in securities fraud class actions. He sent Grundfest an email: "I see you've put a new twist on things."

The intellectual jousting match between Grundfest and Pritchard is no longer just academic. Any day now, in the case Halliburton Co v. Erica P. John Fund, the Supreme Court will decide the future of securities fraud class actions, litigation that has generated more than $80 billion in settlements and untold billions more in legal fees. Grundfest and Pritchard filed competing friend-of-the court briefs, both supporting Halliburton but advocating different rationales for curtailing shareholder cases.

The court may, of course, decide to make no change, but if the justices do rein in securities fraud litigation, it's widely expected that they will lean on arguments advanced by Pritchard or Grundfest.

But which one?

BEGINNING WITH "BASIC"

The foundation of securities fraud class actions is a 1988 Supreme Court decision in the case Basic v. Levinson. It applied to fraud litigation a then-voguish economic theory, the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which posits that share prices reflect all publicly available information. The court said that when a broadly-traded corporation publicly misrepresents the truth, it perpetrates a "fraud on the market" - so individual shareholders need not show that they relied on corporate misstatements.