Ineffective Assistance of Counsel DNA Evidence Prejudice

Commonwealth v. Pruitt, PICS Case No. 17-1044 (Pa. June 20, 2017) Saylor, C.J.; Wecht, J., dissenting (33 pages).

There was arguable merit to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to challenge DNA evidence offered by the Commonwealth; however, defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had counsel provided more able stewardship relative to this evidence. The court affirmed an order denying defendant relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act.

Defendant Michael Pruitt faced multiple charges arising from an incident in 2003. According to the Commonwealth, he forcibly entered the home of Greta A. Gougler on Sept. 23, 2003, and robbed, raped and murdered her. At trial, the Commonwealth offered defendant's confession to police in which he admitted forcibly entering Gougler's home and inflicting violence upon her, though he denied any intention to kill her and denied raping her. The Commonwealth also offered, inter alia, an analysis of DNA evidence taken from the scene by forensic scientist Lisa Mihalacki linking defendant to the crimes. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, rape, robbery and other offenses and returned a death verdict. Defendant sought relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), with the assistance of attorneys from the Federal Community Defender Office. Those attorneys were later removed and replaced with appointed counsel. The PCRA court denied defendant relief. On appeal, defendant argued that there were multiple flaws in the Commonwealth's DNA analysis and that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to apprehend and capitalize on the alleged deficiencies. In support of this argument, defendant presented testimony from a forensic geneticist who testified that the male component of the DNA evidence sample taken from the victim was of low-template quality and, therefore, generated a great deal of subjectivity in interpreting the testing results. Defendant also offered testimony from the attorney primarily responsible for his presentation at the guilt phase of the trial. Counsel said he had not been significantly concerned with the DNA evidence due to other compelling evidence demonstrating the rape. He also testified that he did not understand the data in Mihalacki's report and merely relied on her representation of a genetic match between the evidence sample and a sample taken from defendant. The court found arguable merit to defendant's challenge to his lawyer's stewardship and opined that counsel could have had no reasonable strategy to support his failure to gain a better understanding of Mihalacki's report. However, defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had counsel provided more able stewardship relative to the DNA evidence. His identity as the robber and killer was never seriously put into contest, even at the PCRA stage, the court opined. Thus, while defendant did not admit to committing rape, the fact of the crime was apparent from the physical evidence.

Chief Justice Wecht dissented, arguing that defendant suffered prejudice from trial counsel's "manifest dereliction" because there was a reasonable probability that, but for that dereliction, the jury would have been left with reasonable doubt as to defendant's culpability for rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.