Will China's hopes of a Modi visit hit a BRICS wall?
South China Morning Post
6 min read
India and China's common ground over Russia's war in Ukraine may be an opportunity to repair their damaged relations, but observers say renormalisation of ties will be difficult.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to India last week raised speculation in Chinese media that his counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar may soon reciprocate - potentially paving the way for Prime Minister Narendra Modi's attendance at the BRICS summit in Beijing later this year.
It was Wang's first visit to India since relations between the two countries hit their lowest point in decades, with the deadly clash two years ago in the disputed Himalayan border region. More than 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese troops died in the encounter.
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Despite their bitter border disputes, the two Asian powers have found some rare common ground in recent weeks, as both rejected Western calls to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
When the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly last month to demand an immediate end to the invasion, Beijing and New Delhi abstained.
The two foreign ministers spoke for three hours in the Indian capital, focusing on de-escalating tensions over the disputed borders while also "exchanging opinions" on the Ukraine situation, according to the Chinese foreign ministry.
But Brahma Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, said China and India's shared stance on Russia would mean little to their border disputes.
"The talks during Wang Yi's visit made little headway because China stuck to its position that the border crisis should not come in the way of renormalising bilateral relations, while India insisted on the rollback of China's April 2020 land grabs as a condition for normalisation," he said.
New Delhi's red line was apparent in national security adviser Ajit Doval's response to Wang's invitation to him for talks in China - he reportedly insisted a visit to Beijing would only occur after the two sides reached a resolution to disengage.
At the same time, Indian media reports have claimed China's military is refusing to disengage, with some voices hailing New Delhi's "tough stance" with Beijing during Wang's visit.
Lin Minwang, a professor in South Asia studies at Fudan University, said Beijing might not have high hopes for a Modi visit to the BRICS summit, but New Delhi could also change its position.
"India is using it as leverage in its border negotiations. However, there are many uncertainties - for example, if the US imposes sanctions on India for buying Russian S-400 [missile systems], it is more likely that Modi would visit and attend the summit."
Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine was an opportunity for the Asian neighbours to improve their strained ties, he said.
Lin observed that while China shared Russia's distrust of Western democracy, India - the world's most populous democratic country - is also a major buyer of Russian oil and arms, and would be unlikely to sever those ties.
"China and India have to withstand pressures from the West, particularly from the US," Lin said. "This could be an opportunity for both parties to improve their relationship."
There have been some optimistic signs. India - which previously targeted Chinese investment over the border stand-off - last month approved 66 foreign investment proposals worth US$1.79 billion from neighbouring states. Many of them are believed to come from China.
But Indian experts say Delhi's position is likely to remain constant, even at the cost of missing the BRICS summit of leading emerging markets, which also includes Russia as well as Brazil and South Africa.
"The only thing that will allow India to participate in BRICS is a complete pulling back of troops and returning to their pre-April 2020 positions," said retired Indian navy commodore R.S. Vasan, now a director of the Centre for China Studies, a Chennai think tank which tracks China-India ties.
"This must have been conveyed by the Indian leadership to Wang Yi during the meetings."
According to Vasan, New Delhi might not be very worried about the implications of skipping BRICS. "It shares good ties with Brazil, Russia and South Africa, at a bilateral level, so its absence at BRICS is unlikely to change that."
Long Xingchun, president of the Chengdu Institute of World Affairs, said China would not accept India's disengagement plan, although their similar position on the Ukraine conflict could slightly ease tensions.
"It only means their traditional friendship with Russia is not affected by the West. India sees China as the biggest threat, which means it has a lot of common interests with the US in dealing with China, not Russia," he said.
"It's impossible for China to make any bigger compromise on the border disputes, and if India insists that disengagement is a priority, then a big improvement in ties is unlikely."
Some say New Delhi's gambit of making its BRICS participation conditional on disengagement could pay off.
The summit's timing - during a flux in the global order caused by the Ukraine crisis and heightened attempts by the West to isolate Russia - makes it a crucial platform for Beijing, and a strategic point of leverage for India.
"Through BRICS, China has sought to uphold a new global order with a new model of governance, away from the West-led global order," said B.R. Deepak, a professor of Chinese and China Studies at New Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University.
"This narrative will suffer an immense dent if China can't keep it together and India decides to skip it."
This is not the first time New Delhi has realised the importance attached by Beijing to multilateral forums and used its attendance tactically.
India refused to join Beijing's forum on its Belt and Road Initiative, attended by more than 35 countries, in 2017 and 2019.
New Delhi stayed away in protest at one of the initiative's key infrastructure projects, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor running through Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is claimed by India.
"India skipped the meeting on its concerns of its sovereignty being violated," Vasan said. "The same concerns have now come back."
